Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room Page #7
Let me interrupt you.
Our chief financial officer
and our chief
accounting officer
flew to New York at Enron's
expense, to sit down,
not with the editors,
but to sit down with
the reporter on that story,
and help her understand the
questions that she was asking.
And the next day
we sat in this small,
dark, windowless conference room
for about three hours,
going through the various aspects
of the company's business.
And I'll never forget this.
When the interview was over,
the other
two executives packed up
their things
and had left the room,
and Andy Fastow turned around
and looked at my editor and me,
and said, 'I don't care what
you write about the company,
just don't make me look bad. '
And Fastow had good reasons
for not wanting to look bad.
There were these partnerships
that were run by Andy Fastow
that were doing business
with Enron.
And these were disclosed
in the company's
financial statements.
But I didn't mention them
in the story I wrote,
because I thought,
well, the accountants
and the board of directors
have said that this is okay.
So I must be crazy to think
there's anything wrong with this.
The story
I ran was actually pretty meek.
The title was
'Is Enron Overpriced? '
But in the end,
I couldn't prove that
it was anything more than
an overvalued stock.
And I was probably too naive
to suspect that it was anything...
anything more than that.
And was her article critical?
Yes it was.
The Fortune magazine article
that's out the headline is,
'Is Enron's Stock Overvalued? '
The gist of the article is that
Enron is sort of a black box...
which, sorry, it's true.
I mean,
it's just difficult for us
to show people the specifics of
how money flows through,
particularly
the wholesale business.
The entire reason
that this analysis
was done by Fortune magazine
is because Business Week
had a favorable article
about Enron the week before.
And there's this competition
with the news...
the news magazines have,
where one says something good,
the other one has to come
and find something bad.
So I think that was kind of
the genesis of it.
So the criticism,
I think, is kind of ridiculous.
When Bethany McLean at Fortune
started analyzing cash flows,
and she had this
wonderful article saying,
'take a look at first quarter,
second quarter, third quarter,
and end of year cash flows. '
There's a reason
she didn't invest in Enron
'cause the financials
didn't make sense.
But you have to be
willing to say
that the emperor
doesn't have any clothes.
And this emperor was
pretty powerful.
We are going to
unveil this morning
a new corporate vision.
Okay, you ready?
One, two, three.
How's this?
It's really hard to know
when Enron first crossed the
line into outright fraud.
But there isn't any doubt
about who the guy was
who led them there.
It was a protege
of Jeff Skilling's
by the name of Andy Fastow.
Andy Fastow was Enron's
chief financial officer.
His job was to
cover up the fact
that Enron was becoming
a financial fantasyland.
Enron essentially was
losing money on a cash basis,
year after year.
And yet it was
reporting profits.
So it was defying
laws of financial gravity.
And the way he was doing it
was with something called
structured finance.
And the maestro of all that
at Enron was Andy Fastow.
Andy was very young.
He was hired by Jeff Skilling
probably before he was even 30
and he idolized Jeff Skilling.
And he certainly wanted to
please the boss.
To please the Boss,
Fastow had to figure out a way
to keep the stock price up
by hiding the fact
that Enron was
thirty billion dollars in debt.
People pressured by the need
to keep the stock price up
begin to cheat a little bit.
But then the
next quarter comes along
and you have to
cheat a little more to
do the new cheating to
make up for the old cheating.
And before long,
you've created a momentum
that now you can't stop.
Fastow created hundreds
of special companies
to perform a magic trick...
prop up Enron's stock by
making its debt disappear.
To outsider investors
it looked like cash was
coming in the door.
In fact Enron was just stashing
its debt in Fastow's companies
where investors
couldn't see it.
It was black magic.
It really was.
You were pulling some
rabbits out of a hat.
They could bury debt;
they could bury losses.
Many of the companies
had exotic names:
Jedi, Chewco Raptors.
LJM was Fastow's
most ambitious creation.
and it would allow
Fastow to conjure
45 million dollars for himself.
Andy, in many ways,
was someone we all knew didn't
have a strong moral compass.
It's almost like
Jeff Skilling said,
'okay, we're hitting
some troubled times.
Let's set up Andy so we can
fill the earnings' holes
when we need to',
knowing that Andy would
probably skim a little bit
off each transaction
for himself.
There's a 'Body Heat'
kind of angle to this,
you know, where
Skilling is Kathleen Turner
and Andy is William Hurt.
You know, in the end,
he got suckered into
helping all the executives
meet their earnings.
What I wish, I, you know,
in retrospect?
I wish I'd never heard of LJM.
Is it your contention
that you knew of it
and it was appropriate?
Arthur Andersen
and our lawyers
had taken a very hard look
at this structure
and they believed
it was appropriate.
If the theory is that Fastow
went rogue somewhere deep
in the jungles of Enron
and was the sole agent
of the apocalypse,
I just don't buy it.
Skilling, Lay,
and the Enron board
had signed off
on Fastow's LJM funds.
They saw the benefits
of letting Fastow
do deals with himself.
It is in Enron's best interest,
because Enron needs the capital,
number one.
In a secret video tape that
surfaced after the bankruptcy,
Fastow can be seen selling LJM
to a group of
Merrill Lynch bankers.
He pitches them on the benefits
of investing in a fund
that only buys assets
from Enron.
Remember, I'm not sellling
the assets to myself.
They own the assets.
They're selling them to LJM2.
Fastow knew what kind of deal
he was offering as Enron's CFO.
He could guarantee
profits for LJM.
I think this is an
extraordinary opportunity.
He has a sort of Cheshire Cat
grin on his face as he talks
about all the ways that
the fund is gonna profit.
And he talks about the
informational advantages
that he is gonna have in
his dual role as Enron's CFO
and as the head of these funds.
conflict of interest?
There is never
any question that
I will be on both sides
of the transaction.
I will always be on the LJM
side of the transaction.
He was general partner of LJM,
while at the same time,
being CFO of Enron.
You know, that's a whole
'nother ball of wax
when you want to talk about
that conflict of interest.
Because no human being should
be put in a situation where,
you know,
every single transaction,
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