No End in Sight Page #4

of academicians between others...

on the danger of the museum?

There for were not asked they...

to provide

more safety and protection...

in the initial phases of the operation?

That I know, not.

They cannot say that the plundering...

they took them as a surprise.

I believe that they did not want to know it.

They did not want to hear it.

In the months before the invasion...

the debate on how many troops

Iraq would be sent...

it was supported privately...

between the military leaders

and Donald Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld and his undersecretary,

Paul Wolfowitz...

they believed that a force

of less than 100.000 troops...

it would be sufficient...

for the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

One month before the invasion...

on the troops went out to the light...

when the Chief of Staff

of the army, Eric Shinseki...

testified before the Committee

with the Senate...

ignoring the pressure

of Rumsfeld and of Wolfowitz.

General Shinseki...

it can indicate us the magnitude...

of forces of the army necessary

for the occupation of Iraq?

About several

hundreds of thousands of soldiers...

they might be necessary.

The reaction was immediate.

What is clear here...

the fact is that to think that they are needed

hundreds of thousands of soldiers...

I believe that it leaves of the logic.

It is inconceivable

that need more forces...

to stabilize Iraq

after the fall of Saddam...

that to carry out the proper war...

and to assure the capitulation

of the forces of Saddam...

and his army. Difficult to imagine.

Difficult to imagine.

Anyone that has experience...

in the interventions in the 90s

it was known that it is precisely the opposite.

So many soldiers are needed

for every thousand inhabitants...

simply to provide

a safety minimum.

Pero Paul Wolfowitz was not imagining it.

Paul Wolfowitz refused

to be interviewed for this documentary.

...

control on

a big part of the geography...

with a class of ethnic tension...

that might cause problems...

and that's why it is needed

great presence of forces of ground.

Was general Shinseki right?

OF THE NEW ARMY OF IRAQ

His best military opinion was asked him...

and it has more experience than I.

He was a commander

of our forces in Bosnia...

it did it during more than one year...

speaks.

Secretary Powell and I...

we were fighting to order more troops...

and we obtain something, but in the end...

it was not sufficient.

Rumsfeld ended up by sending

160.000 troops to Iraq.

I believe that the war would be different...

if there was...

a leadership that it understood...

first, which is to be

in the area of the combat...

that has served in the armed forces...

and, second, which had talent of control...

to do that this works.

The tall officials...

that deprived of authority the army

...

they had no experience in

reconstruction of postwar period...

and almost no military experience.

Cheney avoided

the military service in Vietnam...

with five postponements of incorporation.

Rumsfeld was a pilot of the marines

in 1950, but it never fought.

Wolfowitz and Never curl

they had served in the army.

Bush avoided to go to Vietnam...

joining

of Texas.

Neither it had experience in politics

exterior before being a president.

We were looking at it and...

that we have military experience...

and we were commenting on it often...

we knew that it was not well.

In April, 2003,

with the plundering still without controlling...

Rumsfeld cancelled the deployment

...

a force of 16.000 soldiers.

We surprised it.

How can you cancel this division?

If this division

it had followed us to Iraq...

we could have stabilized Iraq...

with our presence only.

On April 19,

the ORHA entered finally Iraq...

to begin

the operations of postwar period.

Of 20 departments

that we wanted to re-use...

16 had been destroyed...

because of the plundering.

We were beginning from zero.

If there do not stay tables, chairs...

typewriters...

where will we receive the Iraqis

to start working?

Structures were not staying...

physical or bureaucratic structures.

I had to discover the people...

asking round there: " Do you know to ...?

" Do you know to anybody of Health?

" Do you know to anybody of the Interior?

" Do you know to anybody of Education? ".

Inside the proper group, there was...

.

We did not have lists of phones...

we had no phone a time...

so I suppose that these lists

they were not so important.

We had no information not to where to go...

we did not know with whom contacting.

It is not the best form...

It is not the best form

of beginning an occupation.

a feeling of disorder...

of that Iraq never recovered.

The armed people took the control...

they were Iraqi with weapon.

THE GAP:

The shootings that I the vi.th..

they were not American

being irresolute...

but Iraqis shooting Iraqis.

You were going in car for the street and suddenly...

it begins a wave

of shots on your head...

and you are in the middle of these types...

going off some others.

The streets were a chaos...

anything...

of service.

Just before the invasion...

Saddam had released

to 100.000 prisoners...

common criminals, of the jails.

In February, 2003...

they invited me to report

to the advisers' panel...

that was advising Rumsfeld...

on matters of political of defense.

I said to them that...

THE DIRECTOR,

CRIMINAL INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

... basing on our experience...

and in the history of Iraq...

it was very probable that

if the USA was intervening...

and it was capturing Baghdad...

we would face

to civil massive disturbances.

I suggested that we needed

...

approximately 4.000 civil police officers in the street...

of judicial advisers

and officials of prisons.

In the end, they coincided

in that it was a good idea...

but that there was no time,

perhaps for the next war.

Before the war,

the mortuary of Baghdad...

it was receiving a murder a month.

In one month, approximately 25 were coming to them a day.

Violations, sometimes for the first time...

violations and murders.

They were kidnapping Iraqi girls.

The women were disappearing...

they stopped going to the school, driving.

The Americans

they were not doing of police officers.

They did not know the streets,

they were not speaking the language...

they did not have sufficient interpreters...

they had no information

...

so it was a pitched battle...

you were feeling that there was a gap.

Very soon, the mosque filled this gap...

that EE.UU created...

on having eliminated Saddam

and not to put anything in his place.

In the quarters chitas,

soon they established the control...

especially, the clergymen

associated with Muqtada to the-Sadr.

Muqtada to the-Sadr was the son

of a famous clergyman chita...

and it began his ascent to the power

being based on the network of his father...

of mosques and charity organizations.

As I said, the small Satan has gone away,

and the big Satan has come.

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