The Challenger Disaster Page #2

unfairly critical of NASA.

Because we believe, and certainly I believe,

that NASA has done an excellent job.

And I believe that the American people think so too.

Anyone?

We have to accept the fact that this shuttle

is the most complex machine that's ever been built.

I understand it has more than two and a half million parts.

It may be, after due consideration,

it's just not possible to identify the cause.

Now...

In terms of scheduling... That's nothing.

I'm sorry, Dr Feynman?

Two and a half million - small potatoes.

No, really look - I don't know much about space rockets,

but I know a little something about probability.

Something I developed called, um... path integral formulation.

It's quantum mechanics, yuck, yuck. But, um...

Basically, what it means is that you can figure out the probability

of something occurring,

not just when you get two and a half million events,

but an infinity of possibilities.

However large the number of causal paths

for whatever happened to Challenger,

an explanation can be found.

What are we doing here if we don't think it's possible?

Right?

Er... Chairman Rogers, I headed an investigation

into the failure of a Titan rocket,

and I suggest I outline the procedure we used there.

I appreciate the offer, General Kutyna,

but I think in this case there's far less collectable evidence.

I don't like to contradict you, sir, but in the case of the shuttle,

as there are human beings aboard,

it generates far more database material.

Mr Rogers, what the general said is the case.

There are external cameras, there are black box recordings,

there are telemetry sensors, there's a great deal of information.

Thank you, General Kutyna.

And Mr Armstrong.

I'm certain we can get back to this.

Please, anyone.

Chairman. Yes.

I don't know about anyone else, but, um...

Coming in, I got some major press attention.

I'd like to know what we're to say.

For the sake of the astronaut families,

what are we saying at this point?

This is very important.

Any and all enquiries from the press

are to be directed to Chairman Rogers's office.

So, the plan is...

lady and gentlemen...

we will reconvene in five days' time.

But for the present, enjoy your stay in Washington.

What?

We're not going to..? That's it.

Keel. We don't start right away?

Great.

Dr Feynman.

Bill Graham, head of NASA.

Thank you.

You're the guy that got me into this.

Well, I took your physics lectures way back, never forgotten.

I think you're going to bring something unique to the Commission.

I abandoned my teaching and a lot of important consulting to come here,

didn't imagine I was going to be told to sit on my tush for a week.

So, here's what I'm going to need.

I'm going to need a crash course in shuttle design.

I need to know everything on how this thing was put together,

so if you can start supplying me with the technical manuals and so forth,

and most of all, you gotta get me straight on the factory floor.

Pretty new to NASA myself -

I actually only took over two months ago.

That's bad timing.

We're based here in Washington,

but the shuttle engines and systems

are all out of the Marshall Space Flight Center.

It pretty much takes care of itself.

You're the head of the whole shmeer,

I mean, you can get me in this Marshall place,

otherwise I'm a busy fella.

I'll do my best. I'll get on it right away.

Right, thanks.

I like that you didn't let up there on the mighty chairman.

You take it. I don't care for limousines.

Well, neither do I -

I'm just a two-star general, don't get assigned a limousine.

Take the subway.

Hmm.

Pleasure. You too.

Taxi!

Oh, and there was a phone call for you, sir.

Please call your doctor.

Dr... Weiss?

The elevator's just to your right, sir.

...to begin what may be a lengthy process.

Millions of Americans who watched our heroes perish

only 73 seconds after take-off on that cold January morning

are waiting for answers.

Nancy and I are pained to the core about the tragedy

of the shuttle Challenger...

Hello.

Graham.

You got me in, great.

I'll take a plane down in the morning.

Thanks.

Alpha plus.

I've always had great faith in and respect for our space programme.

We don't hide our space programme.

We don't keep secrets and cover things up.

We do it all upfront and in public.

That's the way freedom is and we wouldn't change it for a minute.

Wow, it's immense.

This is an identical craft?

No, it's a training simulator.

but for your purposes, the flight deck systems, the payload bay, etc,

virtually identical.

Want to see the flight deck?

You have four human beings jammed in this space?

Can I sit here?

Yeah.

Wow.

OK. So...

they got S-Band communication links...

environmental control systems...

cabin pressure gauges...

What is that? Emergency oxygen.

Don't touch things.

Hmm.

Come on.

Dick Feynman. I'm on the Commission.

I got nothing to hide.

If I was to ask you engineers,

never mind what the managers say, but you guys...

Given all your experience,

what you thought the probability was of an accident on any single launch,

what would you say?

I mean, if you don't want to say out loud,

perhaps you could write it down on a piece of paper.

So you're looking at the solid rocket boosters.

OK, so...

They're not made here.

No - they're made by contractors, Morton Thiokol in Utah.

Railroaded into Kennedy in sections.

That's a pretty standard tang and clevis joint.

Look, there's no ways it was the solid rocket boosters.

How so certain? Because they don't fly with holes in them.

If it was the SRB, it would have exploded on the launch pad.

These kept on flying, you see it in the footage.

You watched the footage. Tell me what you saw.

What went through your mind?

What did you think it was?

I thought it was the main engines.

OK. Why? Why the main engines?

Because of the complexity.

They're working at the outer edge of any experience base.

In the blade technology?

No, no, no, it's more than the blades, it's...

Hey...

There is no ways that I'm ratting out my co-workers here.

Look, pal...

If we're not allowed to find out what went wrong,

there will be no more co-workers.

All these jobs will be gone, kaput.

Won't be another shuttle launch.

Of the events on the morning of the 28th of January,

the Presidential Commission investigating the accident,

headed by former Secretary of State William Rogers,

has met mostly behind closed doors.

So far, it's given no hints about what it believes

may have been the cause.

Meanwhile, off the coast of Florida,

the hunt for Challenger wreckage continues.

The combined NASA, naval and coastguard operation

involving 14 ships, four submarines and 11 aircraft

is combing hundreds of square miles of ocean.

Although NASA today released pictures showing recovered debris,

they've been unable to confirm that they've found the crew compartment.

In the absence of detailed information

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