The Gatekeepers Page #6

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"That's all we want.

"The more we suffer,

the more you'll suffer.

"Finally, after 50 years, we've

reached a balance of power,

"a balance,

"your F-16 versus

our suicide bomber. "

lyad Saraj's statement

gave me a very clear insight.

I suddenly understood the

suicide bomber phenomenon.

I suddenly understood our

reaction very differently.

How many operations did we

launch because we hurt,

because when they blow up buses it

really hurts us and we want revenge?

How often have we done that?

Yahya Ayyash was

the most senior terrorist

that ever operated

against Israel,

certainly the most

senior member of Hamas.

He was an engineer.

He knew how to make bombs

out of improvised explosives.

Those were the bomb belts

that blew up in buses.

Secondly, he knew how to convince

someone to commit suicide.

Finally, he had survival skills

that beggared description.

For years, every IDF soldier

carried his picture.

He was undoubtedly our

number one most wanted man.

Yahya Ayyash moved

from Samaria to Gaza.

It took some time

to get that intelligence.

Then we started basic surveillance to see

who was around him, where he might go.

Of course, everyone

has his weak points.

Yahya Ayyash's weak point

was his wife and son.

After a long time living alone in

Gaza, he asked them to join him.

We knew the whole story, and I

decided to let them into Gaza.

I thought, once they were in

Gaza, he'll want to see them.

Maybe the mouse would

come out of his hole.

Then we found out that

he really misses his father.

How did you know that he

wanted to talk to his father?

We heard.

From a source?

We hear rumors.

He never used a cell phone.

People made calls for him.

After weeks of persuasion,

he agreed to speak to his

father for a few minutes.

At this point, we started

laying the groundwork

for our cell phone to

infiltrate his surroundings.

Then we started doing

all the backup work,

making sure that an innocent

cell phone had explosives in it.

The Shin Bet are

technical experts,

experts at making small

appliances with lots of power,

not so much broadcast power

as explosive power.

Since it was difficult for us to

make direct contact with Ayyash,

we used the services

of a middleman.

He gave him the cell phone.

One Friday,

everything was in place.

We set off the explosive

charge in the phone

and nothing worked.

Everything we built up over eight

months fell apart in front of us.

Everything worked perfectly.

Then we click to get the coffee

and it doesn't come out.

Nothing happened.

Within days, the phone was back

in its natural environment.

We saw that no one

suspected anything,

that things went on as normal.

We all got together again.

On Friday morning,

his father called him.

The wire tapper recognized

Ayyash's voice and told us.

Someone hit a button

and the cell phone exploded

while it was right next

to Yahya Ayyash's ear.

He was killed on the spot and

no one around him was hurt.

More importantly, no one on the

ground floor heard the explosion.

The operation was coordinated with

the Air Force. It went very nicely.

It was very clean... elegant.

I like operations like that.

They're nice and tidy.

To some people, the

assassination of Yahya Ayyash,

at a time that seemed

relatively free of attacks,

some said it was a mistake.

Sometimes it feels quiet

and you say, "Oh!

We disturbed the calm. "

Two months later, it seemed

like the whole country was exploding.

Yes.

Don't you see

the connection?

Yes, we know for a fact,

after Ayyash's assassination

a group crossed the fence

and left Gaza to organize

attacks from the West Bank.

Of course I see

the connection.

But if we make the equation,

if we assassinate them, they'll

commit suicide attacks,

if we don't assassinate

them, they won't.

The second part of

the equation is false.

After we pulled

out of Gaza,

we couldn't enter

the Palestinian areas,

unexpectedly, with a small

force, and exit safely.

How do you surprise a terrorist?

From the air, from a distance.

He has no idea where

the missile came from.

But to fire a missile

from a distance,

you need very precise intel

and not for one split second,

but for the entire operation.

What is targeted

assassination?

Where do we

break the chain?

Okay, we'll injure.

If necessary, we'll even kill

whomever comes to kill us.

What happens to the people

surrounding him?

What happens to the people

who make the explosives,

who transport him,

who make the plans,

who gather the intel,

and who just preach the idea?

They don't kill.

They preach an ideology

that, in the end,

creates jihad and leads

to the death of Israelis.

Salah Shehadeh was what

we called the "hairspring,"

that set Hamas's entire terror

operation in Gaza into motion.

The hunt for him

was very difficult,

with lots of intelligence

tools invested in it.

At some stage, it was

clear that he was home,

that his daughter wasn't,

and that only his

wife was with him.

We agreed by phone,

the Chief of Staff, me, the Defense

Minister and the Prime Minister.

The Air Force dropped a

one-ton bomb on the house.

Unfortunately, because of

inaccurate intelligence,

innocents were killed.

No one knows

the final number, 9-14.

When you drop a one-ton

bomb on a densely populated area,

like in the Shehadeh incident,

obviously bystanders

will be hurt...

No, it's not obvious.

No. You gather intelligence.

Where do people live?

How many? Who? What are the chances?

Where do you shoot from?

The implications of this incident,

in terms of collateral damage,

led to criticism of how

we could drop a bomb

on a home in

the middle of Gaza.

An American

asked me about it.

I said, "We know about your

methods in Afghanistan.

"You bombed a wedding

and 70 people were killed

"and no one knows if

the target was killed. "

Overkill! It's security stupidity!

It's military stupidity.

I don't know what to call it,

but it makes no sense that to kill

the most important man in Gaza

you have to drop a

one-ton bomb on a house

surrounded by homes with

families and children.

That can't be moral,

it's ineffective militarily

and it's certainly not humane.

Is it just? Not that either.

There's a concept,

"the banality of evil. "

When you start doing it en

masse, 200, 300 people die

because of the idea of

"targeted assassinations. "

Suddenly the processes become

a kind of conveyor belt.

You ask yourself less

and less where to stop.

September 6, 2003, was, for me, my

toughest day as head of the Shin Bet.

On that day the

State of Israel had

a chance to get rid of the

biggest terrorist group

in a single blow.

We had very reliable

and precise intel

that the Hamas leadership

was going to hold a meeting

like they never had before,

and probably never will.

I think there were ten

or twelve people there,

but the crme de la crme,

the merde de la merde.

Really... everyone was there.

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