Jango Page #9

It was not necessary.

We knew, we trusted we'd succeed.

And there was a meeting among ourselves,

during which we tried to estimate

how long it would last.

The estimation was that the fight

would last for six months. At least.

I was regarded as an optimist,

I thought that it would

be over in one month.

The only one who

got it right was Golbery,

who said:
" it will fall apart

like a castle of cards."

Despite the surprise,

despite the weakening that

the government had been experiencing,

if president Joo Goulart

had decided to resist,

to counter-strike -

he still had troops,

he still had elements here in Rio,

to take over the Guanabara palace,

where Lacerda had been scheming -

he could have won that fight.

Or at least put up

a longer fight.

But he decided not to resist,

which, in my opinion, was the right decision,

because it avoided bloodshed,

and today, after those informations

were released by the Americans,

we became aware of the involvement

of the American government

in the military coup that

was underway in Brazil.

The story that the U.S. had sent

ships to Brazil

was old news.

It had even been mentioned in

an American talk show called

"Firing Line" , with William Buckley.

He was interviewing at that time,

in the early 70s,

governor - former governor

at that time, Carlos Lacerda -,

when someone from the audience stood up

and said:
" look, that is not true,

I was in the Caribbean at the time,

embarked, doing military work,

and the ship I was in

was rerouted to the Brazilian coast

at the time of the revolution.

There were stories like that.

And tales too

that maybe the U.S. had actually

sent ships to the Brazilian coast,

but that they were only tankers.

What was discovered about

Operation " Brother Sam"

is that it was much bigger.

I mean, in fact, it included

the four tankers,

the four tankers were full

to ensure the supply of fuel

for the revolution

if the movement had to last,

if it faced too much resistance

and had to last for

over one month.

There were 136 thousand barrels of

regular gas,

aviation kerosene,

all that.

Battleships were also

involved,

six destroyers

if I'm not mistaken

One aircraft carrier was sent to the

Brazilian coast,

a ship that specialized

in carrying helicopters,

24 combat and transport planes.

A large amount of ammunition was embarked,

which never made it to Brazil,

but that was loaded

into ships in the U.S..

Those ships, from different points

in the Atlantic,

converged at the Brazilian

coast.

A few hours before sunrise

on ApriI 2nd,

the entire operation was demobilized

when news came

that the military

had already taken over.

This was the Operation " Brother Sam" .

On ApriI 2, with the people of

Rio Grande do SuI demobilized,

Jango went to So Borja and,

from there, to his exile in Uruguay.

ENLlST HERE.

In Rio, the police of Carlos Lacerda

arrested a Chinese trade mission,

under charges of terrorism.

It was up to Sobral Pinto, the old advocate

of political prisoners

to prove the innocence of the diplomats.

Communist leader Gregrio Bezerra, was

dragged through the streets of Recife,

and arrested.

Among the prisoners, one traitor:

soldier Jos Alselmo dos Santos,

known as corporal Anselmo.

A leader of the association of mariners

and head of the rebellion

at the metal workers' union,

years later he would be

exposed as a police undercover agent

by the armed activists.

In Rio de Janeiro, the middle class

would perform its version

of the " march, with God and for freedom" ,

with the victory guaranteed.

" The right to be born. "

This civic furor would soon be

used to support the campaign

" Donate gold for the good of Brazil" ,

an attempt at solving

the economic problems of the country

with acts of patriotic charity.

After their arrival in Rio,

Mouro and Magalhes were commended

for the triumph

of a movement that

they apparently headed.

The way I see it, there were

two coups in '64.

The first was a typical

Latin-American coup.

Certain civiI forces

supporting a military movement

that was initiated in Minas Gerais

and that actually,

in its exterior appearance,

was actually what we know

about Latin-American history.

Now, during the course of that coup,

another one took place.

On the inside.

That was the one that lingered

and expelled all

civiI and military characters,

that took part in the first coup.

That was the coup that remained,

it was this coup that

buiIt a military core

and an economic system.

Because, in fact,

there were two movements.

The one from Minas, which I refer to

as a na:
ve, patriotic movement,

that wanted only to bring

order to the country,

and wanted nothing for itself.

I never did.

So much so that, after my

arrival in Rio de Janeiro,

Carlos Lacerda

and Juscelino came to me,

saying it was time I took over

and I told them

I had not carried out the movement

to become president of the republic.

It was not to claim anything for myself.

What I wanted was to have

BraziI find its true way

of order, of tranquility.

In Rio de Janeiro there was

a group that got ready.

That really got ready.

It seems that LincoIn Gordon

was connected to this group.

Because this group had money.

We, back in Minas, did it

with our own funds.

Which was not much.

And we never got any indemnification.

Because president Castelo...

was part of the other group.

The appointment of general Castelo Branco

instituted in BraziI the system

of indirect elections for president

with a single candidate protected

by institutional acts.

I hereby declare the Honorable Humberto

de Alencar Castelo Branco

vested in office

of president of the republic

of the United States of Brazil

I shall defend and fulfill, with honor

and loyalty the Constitution of Brazil.

We shall plunge ahead

knowing that the remedy

against the ill effects

of the extreme left

shall not be the birth

of a reactionary right.

My deeds shall be those

of an uncompromised

head of state

during the process

of election of the Brazilian

to whom I shall convey this office

on January 31 , 1966.

1964 closes the '54 cycle of colonels.

This time they were united

and had a plan.

The concepts developed

in the Superior War College

replaced social justice

for development

and democracy for security.

Castelo Branco's cabinet

had politicians from UDN

and technocrats, now at

the service of the new order.

But the true core of power

after '64

laid in the hands of the brothers in arms.

General Costa e Silva

in the ministry of war,

General Ernesto Geisel

as Head of the Military Household

and General Golbery do Couto e Silva,

who used lPES records

to set up the National Information Service.

During the Castelo Branco administration,

old alliances were recovered.

The law on remittance of profits

was revoked,

and the trust of the United States in the

Brazilian democracy was reestablished.

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